Abstract| W e model a labor market that includes referral networks using an agent based simulation. Agents maximize their employment satisfaction by allocating resources to build friendship networks and to adjust search i n tensity. We use a local selection evolutionary algorithm, which m a i ntains a diverse population of strategies, to study the adaptive graph topologies resulting from the model. The evolved networks display mixtures of regularity and randomness, as in small-world networks. A second characteristic emerges in our model as time progresses; the population loses eciency due to over-competition for job referral contacts in a w ay similar to social dilemmas such as the tragedy of the commons. Analysis reveals that the loss of global tness is driven by an increase in individual robustness, which a l l o ws agents to live longer by surviving job losses. The behavior of our model suggests predictions for a number of policies.
I. Introduction W E use an evolutionary model to study a robust nding in US labor markets: approximately 50 of workers in the US economy rst hear about their job through a friend, relative, or other social contact 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 . 1 In particular, we use an evolutionary model based on local selection algorithms 7 , 8 . Such a n a pproach di ers from traditional genetic algorithms in two main ways. First, individual tness is not determined by comparison to the tness of other individuals in the population. Instead agents survive and reproduce if they are able to gather enough energy in xed supply to meet a survival requirement. An agent survives if he nds a suitable strategy niche. This di erence allows a more diverse population to evolve. Second, since tness is endogenous there is no predetermined tness function, the population size varies depending on the collective strategies of the existing agents. These two c haracteristics make local selection algorithms a natural choice to study diverse dynamic systems such as economies and markets.
Previous research suggests that reducing the uncertainty of a new hire is the primary reason for hiring by referral 9 , 10 , 6 . Referral based hiring reduces uncertainty because an employer can be more sure of the quality o f a w orker if someone she knows refers the worker. Here, we concen- trate on another idea. In order for referral based hiring to be e ective, social networks must e ciently transfer job information. How are social networks able to do this? People do not usually pick friends in order to get a job. People might p i c k friends for example because of similar interests or geographic location. Therefore friends tend to exist in clustered groups where the friends of a person tend to know each other. If Jane is a friend of Ken and a friend of Judy, it is likely that Ken and Judy are friends too.
Very clustered locally structured social networks inhibit the transfer of information. If everybody whom you know also knows the same people, it will be di cult for information to transfer across social groups. For this reason Granovetter 2 argues that friends outside of the usual social circle of a person are especially important i n l o c a ting jobs. These friends will hear about jobs that you and your usual circle of friends will not. Therefore it would seem that a network with a smaller amount of local structure would yield a better transfer of job information than a social network.
In this paper we propose to model a simple labor market with an agent based simulation. Agents attempt to maximize individual employment outcomes by c hoosing a mix of social networks and direct job search. We then view the characteristics of the social networks that develop to establish whether they transfer information e ciently using measures existing in the social network literature.
Our model yields two main results. First, the evolved social networks resemble small-world networks 11 . There is a large amount of local structure in the evolved networks. But the local structure does not signi cantly a ect the ability of the network to transfer information between members of the population. The result indicates that the local structure we observe in real social networks does not preclude e cient information transfer.
Second, as evolution progresses agents over-compete with regard to the amount of the search strategy employed. Agents evolve t o ward expending more energy on either social networks or direct search, depending on the relative costs than is e cient for the population. However, the strategy chosen appears individually e cient; agents live longer on average than at the point of maximum population e ciency. This result may b e c haracterized as a social dilemma because cooperation between agents would serve to bene t the population as a whole but doing so is not optimal for the individual agents. The second result helps us to understand the di erence between global population and local individual e ciency in our evolutionary model.
A detailed description of our model and the evolutionary algorithm we e m p l o y i s g i v en in the next section. We then characterize our results and place them in the context of previously existing research in Section III. How can programs that limit the importance of referral based hiring such as a rmative action be used to curb overnetworking in the form of old-boys networks"? This and other policy considerations based on our ndings are discussed in Section IV.
II. The Model
The setup of our model has two components: jobs and agents. Jobs in the economy are xed in supply, with randomly assigned, uniformly distributed wages. Agents search for open jobs in the economy using two methods: rst, each agent is able to directly search for jobs. Expending e ort on direct search increases the likelihood an agent nds a job on her own. We model direct search a s a n abstraction of methods by w h i c h a person may i m p r o ve t h e likelihood of nding a job. For instance many individuals look for employment b y reading classi ed advertisements in a newspaper, by applying to various rms directly, o r b y improving education. All of these methods are considered direct search in our model.
Additionally, agents may c hoose to expend e ort by m a king friends. Friends are valuable because agents tell their friends about the jobs they nd through direct search. We use the term friend" to refer to all activities by w h i c h a person may learn about a job from another person. Examples include: social events, telephone calls, electronic mail, or personal conversations.
Agents will be subject to selection pressure in the economy. Each search method has an energy cost for the agent. Agents gain energy by earning wages. The agents who run out of energy die and the agents who gain in excess of a threshold reproduce by cloning a duplicate agent with similar search strategies and social networks.
Speci cally, there are N agents in the economy indexed as i. Note that N will change as the economy e v olves. Let F i = F i1 ; F i2 ; :::; F ifi b e t h e v ector of friends of agent i where each element refers to an agent currently alive i n the population. The size of F i is f i , the number of friends of agent i. We de ne a social graph or referral network by de ning each a g e n t i as a vertex and creating an unweighted directed edge from each e l e m e n t o f F i to i since every element o f F i is another vertex in the graph. De ne an edge connecting a speci c friend, j, of agent i as edge i; j. Agents de ne an evolving social graph through their choices of friends.
Let s i 2 0; 1 be the amount of e ort used in direct search b y agent i; and let e i be the energy held by agent i. Let W = w 1 ; w 2 : : : w N0 be the wages associated with each job in the economy. Note that the number of jobs N 0 is a xed parameter. If agent i holds a job his wage is w i , which corresponds to one of the wages in W . E a c h job can only be occupied by one agent o r a j o b m a y b e v acant.
In each period t, e a c h agent currently alive i s c harged unit costs c s and c f for the amount of e ort spent searching and for the number of friends, respectively. The agent receives replacement energy from his wage, w i . There is also a xed energy cost for each period, c min . Therefore: e i t + 1 = e i t , c min , s i tc s , f i tc f + w i t: 1 Now de ne a reproduction threshold as . I f e i t+1 , agent i reproduces and a new agent j is formed. If e i t + 1 0, agent i dies. The evolutionary dynamic, the distribution of jobs and wages, the costs of friends and searching, and the network topology determine a carrying capacity for the population in the economy. If agents use energy e ciently through their choices of search a n d friends the size of the population increases.
In each period, the level of s i and f i is subject to a shock or mutation for every agent. Speci cally, a draw from a uniform distribution , s ; + s is added to the agent's level of search i n tensity. And, with probability f , t h e a g e n t gains or loses a friend. These mutations provide the necessary variation for the members of the population to evolve toward an optimal network and search strategy.
A. The Simulation Algorithm
The simulation runs according to a local selection algorithm. The algorithm's connection with ecological models is discussed at length elsewhere 7 , 12 . Here we focus on the characteristics of the algorithm that are employed in our job market model. The tness of an agent is not derived by ranking the members of the population. Instead, an agent survives if she gathers enough energy to exceed her costs. If an agent nds a strategy niche that sustains her, she survives even if other members of the population do better. Thereby local selection maintains diversity i n a population. Additionally, because tness is not predetermined, the systems de nes an endogenous carrying capacity. A system subject to local selection carries as many agents as are able to nd successful strategies. Because of the ability t o m a i n tain diversity in strategies and the ability t o e v olve a population size, local selection algorithms provide a natural choice for modeling a labor market.
We p r o vide an outline of the algorithm in Figure 1 . In period 0 of the simulation N 0 agents are created with each agent i having an initial level of search i n tensity, s i = s 0 , and an initial number of friends, f i = f 0 , for all i. W e s e t the initial leve l s o f e a c h as a parameter of the model. All agents have the same strategy in the initial period. For each agent i, f i directed non-duplicated edges are created from random agents in the population to i. The set of these edges across all agents de nes an initial social network for the population. Next, for each o f N 0 jobs a wage is chosen from a uniform distribution in 0; 1. We randomly assign each of these jobs to one member of the initial population. Therefore there is full employment at period 0.
For each period following period 0, all agents go through three loops: job search, energy allocation, and mutation. In the job search l o o p a g e n ts are chosen in random order. When an agent i is chosen she is allowed to attempt to upgrade her job. her f i friends may tell her about a job. Information about a job only travels one step along the social network. If an agent tells a friend about a job, the friend is not allowed to tell an additional friend. We c hose to limit the number of steps information travels across the network to model the notion that referral based hiring adds certainty t o t h e hiring process. If information travels many steps the additional certainty an employer gains about a worker through referral decreases because the referee is not likely to know the potential employee well. Agent i picks the job with the highest wage among the open jobs she hears about, or keeps her current job if it has a higher wage. We continue the job search l o o p u n til every agent has had an opportunity to search for a job. Following the job search loop, we allocate energy. Each agent p a ys costs c f and c s for each of the friends he maintains and the e ort he expends in searching for jobs. He also pays an additional energy cost c min in each period. If agent i is employed he is paid a wage w i that corresponds to the job he holds. Each period agents collect the di erence between costs paid and wages received in an energy reserve, e i , that is updated according to Equation 1 .
If e i is greater than the threshold the agent reproduces by producing a clone with identical strategies and social network. If e i is less than 0 the agent dies. When agent i replicates a new agent j, she replicates her current strategies and social network as well: s j t = s i t and F j t = F i t. The energy of agent i is split equally between i and j: e i t + 1 = e j t + 1 = e i t=2. When an agent dies all incoming edges are deleted. All outgoing edges are replaced as follows: if agent i dies, and agent i has an outgoing edge to agent k, a new edge is created from a randomly chosen agent h to agent k that replaces edge k;i. Replacing these edges keeps the number of incoming edges constant for all surviving members of the population. If this was not done there would be a downward bias in the number of edges for the population.
T h e n a l l o o p o f e a c h period of the simulation introduces the variations and mutations necessary for the population to evolve. We re each a g e n t with probability in every period. Firing agents provides an incentive for them to maintain search e v en if employed. If agents were not occasionally red, the agents occupying jobs paying wages greater than c min would have no incentive t o s e a r c h for a better job; they would live forever without further e ort.
There are two sources of mutation that allow strategies of individual agents to evolve. First, with probability f each agent gains or loses a friend in each period. If an agent i loses a friend, a random incoming edge to agent i is deleted. If agent i gains a friend, a random agent j is selected as long as j is not already a friend of i and an edge i; j i s created. Second, a mutation to the search i n tensity o f e a c h agent occurs. A random draw from the uniform distribution , s ; + s is added to the current search i n tensity s i for each a g e n t i. The job search, wage, and mutation loops are repeated for Z periods in each run of the simulation.
B. Measuring the Networks
We c haracterize our results using measures introduced in the small-world networks literature 11 , 13 , 14 . We measure the global structure of a graph using the diameter or path length, L. The path length is the average of the shortest path between all pairs of vertices in the graph, i.e. the average number of edges that must be traveled along the shortest path between all pairs of vertices; L = 1 P P P p=1 L p where P = NN , 1 excluding paths from a node to itself is the number of pairs of nodes in the graph; p indexes each individual pair and L p measures the distance between each individual pair p. Our algorithm does not guarantee that an evolved graph will be fully connected. Therefore there may be some pairs of nodes for which n o path exits, i.e., L p = 1. To accommodate for a nonconnected graph we actually use the following alternative de nition of diameter 15 :
The measured path length of a social network will help us quantify the ability to transfer information across the network. A short path length implies that information ows easily e ciently in the network. The longer the path length, the more di cult it is for agents to nd out about jobs.
To quantify the local structure of a graph, de ne a clustering coe cient, C, a s f o l l o ws: if agent i has f i adjacent neighbors in the social graph, then this neighborhood denes a subgraph with at most f i f i , 1 edges. C i is the fraction of these edges that exist in the neighborhood of i and C is the average C i for all i:
Essentially C is the likelihood that agents j and k are connected given that each is connected to i. It therefore measures the social cliquishness" of the graph. We measure average clustering, C, a verage search i n tensity, n umber of friends, and population size each period. We measure average path length, L, at the end of every run. 2 We normalize our results using random graphs. Random graphs provide us with an approximation to the theoretical lower bound for minimal path length see 13 p. 501. In addition, random graphs contain minimal structure at the local level. Since all edges are equally likely to be connected, a random graph provides a lower bound on the clustering of a graph. Therefore, random graphs represent the natural choice as a benchmark. If the statistics from the evolved graph are similar to the random graph we infer that the evolved graph is random in nature. Note that all edges, except for those created through selective reproduction, are created at random. Therefore any deviation from randomness in the evolved graph indicates an evolutionary selection toward the characteristics of the graph observed.
When each simulation is complete we create a set of G random graphs as follows: we create a graph g with the same number of nodes and edges as in the evolved graph. We randomly choose two n o d e s , i, j, for each edge and connect them thereby creating edge i; j. When we h a ve done this for every edge we measure average path length, L rand g , and clustering, C rand g , for the randomly created graph according to Equations 2 and 3. We a verage these quantities over the G random graphs and then normalize each e v olved graph by the corresponding random diameter and clustering coe cient. We repeat this process for each r u n r of the simulation. Finally, w e a verage the ratios over R runs using a given set of parameters, to obtain the normalized ratios: 3 We obtain the results from a set of 10 simulations with the parameters shown in Table I . We randomly seed each simulation and present results averaged over the simulations.
A. Small-World E ect
In a local selection evolutionary algorithm, population size measures the e ciency with which a g e n ts use energy. In our model if agents are e cient at nding jobs and transferring information between individuals the population will be high. Figure 2 shows the average population size over the 10 runs. Note the large increase in population between the rst and last periods. The population begins with 50 agents but the initial randomly assigned search strategies are poor and the population drops o slightly to around 43 agents after about 12 periods. The agents then begin developing better job search strategies and the population quickly increases to a high of approximately 75 agents before settling to a stable population just above 7 0 a g e n ts.
Regarding the strategies used to accomplish the population increase, the agents have increased both friends and direct search with respect to their initial values. In the initial period each a g e n t had 2 friends. The agents now h a ve an average of 2.22 friends. 4 Direct search has increased from .0100 in the rst period to an average of .0114 at the end of the simulation, but this change is not statistically signi cant for most runs. Interestingly, the large population increase has occurred for relatively small changes in number of friends and intensity of search. A larger change, however, has taken place in the topology of the evolved networks. Let us rst take a qualitative l o o k a t s u c h c hange. Fig. 3 . Topology of one of the 10 evolved networks right and of a random network with the same number of nodes and edges left. To d r a w these graphs we start with a random agent a n d iteratively pick a neighbor with a greedy procedure. For each node i we nd the agent with the most similar social network by maximizing a score, over agents j not previously placed on the graph, based on the overlap between friends of i and friends, and friends of friends, of j. W e repeat the process until all nodes are placed on the circle. If an agent selected has no friends in common with any remaining agent, a new random agent is selected. Figure 3 illustrates the clustering of friends produced by t h e adaptive process. The problem of placing nodes on a plane to minimize edge crossing is NP-complete 16 . Therefore, for more clustered graphs, the greedy procedure used to draw the graphs will result in fewer long" edges across the middle of the network and in denser connections at the periphery. Upon comparing the two graphs, the di erence in local structure is evident. Many more of the agents in the evolved graph are friends of their neighbors and also friends with the friends of their friends. The agents have organized a highly clustered population. As discussed above, clustered networks generally are poor at transferring information because the average path length between nodes tends to be long. However, Watts and Strogatz 11 , 13 have quanti ed how clustered networks can transfer information e ciently. Starting with a regular" graph say, a grid they replace existing edges of the graph with random edges and nd that the characteristic path length of the graph decreases to that of a random graph quickly. The clustering of the graph falls as well, but not nearly as quickly as the path length. A small-world graph is then roughly de ned as a graph which exhibits a path length close to that of a random network but with clustering close to that of a regular network 13 . Graphs of lm appearances of actors Kevin Bacon numbers", power grids, and neural networks are used as real world examples to show that small-world networks exist in reality 13 , 17 .
By gauging the diameter and clustering measures of our evolved network with respect to random networks, we a r e able to quantitatively compare the evolved structure to the de nition of a small-world network using C avg and L avg . Results from the ten simulations with the parameters above yield C avg = 3 :57 and L avg = 1 :44 after 200 periods; therefore our graphs resemble a small-world graph C avg 1 and L avg 1. From this result we infer that clustered social networks still transfer job information e ciently. T h e Fig. 4 . Small-world e ect. A t-test reveals that while Lavg is insensitive to the strategy cost ratio, Cavg satis es the small-world de nition only in the middle region. A t-test on Cavg at the middle and end points of the region reveals statistically signi cant di erences between the sets of simulations t-statistic=2.065 between cs=c f = 5 0 a n d cs=c f = 5, and t-statistic=2.022 b e t ween cs=c f = 5 0 a n d cs=c f = 100.
local structure observed in social networks does not preclude the e cient transfer of information.
As a sensitivity analysis of the small-world e ect we e xamine a range of strategy costs. Leaving c s = 1 w e v ary c f . The values for C avg and L avg at the end end of the runs are plotted vs c s =c f in Figure 4 . The amount of local structure depends on the relative costs of friends and direct job search. For low c f , m a n y friends are easy to maintain and therefore the structure does not matter as much. For really high c f , friends are too expensive to maintain and the local structure disappears. But in the critical region of intermediate cost ratios we observe a consistent small-world phenomenon due to emergent local structure.
B. Second Order Evolution
In the previous subsection we observed that agents are able to produce e cient n e t works in a short period of time. As a further test of the robustness of the e ciency found above w e increase the length of the simulations to 5,000 periods. Again we run 10 simulations and obtain results from averages over the runs. Figure 5 displays the average population size. After reaching a maximum around the 150th period, the population size steadily decreases until reaching an equilibrium level of about 63 agents around period 3,500. As we stated above, population size measures how e ciently a system uses energy. Therefore it appears that the agents in the population have lost some of the e ciency gained early in the simulation. Figure 6 displays the average number of friends over the same period. Average friends increase dramatically and the increase corresponds strongly to the decrease in population and e ciency loss. The correlation between average friends and population size is -0.896.
To q u a n tify the degree of e ciency loss we compare the evolution of the population to that of a population with A t-test con rms that the two population sizes are signi cantly di erent at the height of the evolved population 99 con dence level, t-statistic=4.386. random selection. Random selection is accomplished using the algorithm of Figure 1 with two v ariations: rst, wages are assigned randomly; each period every agent is assigned the wage of a randomly chosen agent from the population regardless of his job status. Second, costs are xed for all agents regardless of strategy choice. For comparison to the original simulation we c hoose the xed cost to be the average total cost paid by the agents in the last period of the evolved simulation. Figure 5 also plots the random selection population size over 5,000 periods. As can be seen in the gure, the size of the evolved population is much larger than the size of the population with random selection at the height of its early peak. The average population at period 200 is approximately 72.4 standard error 2.49 for the evolved agents and the average population for the randomly selected agents is 58.6 1.93. But the evolved population size steadily decreases over time until converging to a population level close to that of random selection. The decrease to the level of random selection implies that the population has lost all of the e ciency gain from the structure of the network observed early in its evolution.
In order to better understand the loss of e ciency we explore the individual tness of agents. Following ecological models we can measure individual tness of agents by the age of agents in the population 7 . The average age of the agents in the 200th and 5,000th periods of the simulation are 57.4 and 69.9 periods, respectively. 5 The average agent in the 5,000th period is twenty-percent older than the average agent in the 200th period. While the evolved strategy of the agents in the 200th period is more e cient for the population highest observed population size, individual agents can do better live longer by increasing the number of friends maintained.
Increasing the number of friends serves two purposes: rst, an employed agent with many friends nds out about better jobs with a higher likelihood. In this sense friends provide an opportunity f o r u p ward mobility. Second, if an agent becomes unemployed his expected duration of unemployment i s l o wer if he has more friends. Friends provide insurance in the case of job loss. But each of these advantages is o set by the higher maintenance cost that must be paid to keep many friends.
In addition the search strategy chosen depends on the strategies chosen by other members of the population. For instance having many friends does little good if everyone else in the population never searches. In this case the friends of an agent n e v er learn about any jobs and thereby cannot provide her with any job information. Also, since the number of jobs in the economy is xed and only one agent can occupy e a c h job, agents must compete with each other over the jobs. If agent j nds out about a job before agent i does, agent i cannot get that job until agent j vacates it. Agents must choose a combination of search strategies that do well given the search strategies of other population members. Therefore it may be advantageous to try to have more friends than the status quo members of the population, as long as it is not too costly. Other members of the population may then respond to your strategy by increasing their number of friends. The dynamic results in an arms race" for social networks where everyone picks a strategy that is best for the individual at the expense of the population.
Therefore the observed phenomenon is similar to a social dilemma in the spirit of the prisoner's dilemma a n d the tragedy of the commons. Here we h a ve a resource in xed supply, jobs, that provides the population with energy. Agents do not choose the e cient strategy as a collective because it is not a stable equilibrium. Instead they maximize individual tness; a strategy that bene ts the individual but hurts global e ciency.
To con rm the above i n terpretation we perform two n a l experiments. In the rst, we decrease the number of friends Remove Two Friends Cap Friends at Three Fig. 7 . Population dynamics in two control experiments. In one experiment, two friends are taken from each a g e n t at period 3,000 and 4,000. The populationsize increasesfollowing each period. In the second experiment, the agents are only allowed a maximum of three friends. Capping the number of friends increases the long run population size and cures the social dilemma of overcompetition observed previously.
held by e v ery agent in the population by t wo at the 3,000th and 4,000th periods. As can be seen in Figure 7 the average population size increases by about 5 agents directly following the removal of friends. However, shortly after the new peak, the population size follows the previously observed decrease.
In the second experiment w e place a restriction on agents that does not allow t h e m t o h a ve more than three friends. As seen before in Figure 2 , the population quickly increases to about 75 agents. Following the peak the population size decreases somewhat, as shown in Figure 7 , but reaches a steady state around 70 agents. In contrast to previous simulations the population size does not decrease further and remains around 70 agents for the duration of the simulation. Limiting the over competition over networking cures the social dilemma.
A nal note on second order evolution can be made upon viewing Figure 8 , which plots C avg and L avg against c s =c f for the networks observed at the 5,000th period. Observe that the structure of the resulting networks remains similar to that of the shorter runs. As observed previously in Figure 4 , the path length ratio remains constant b e t ween 1.3 and 1.5 for all cost ratios. The clustering ratio increases with the cost of friends; however, it takes higher c f to generate the same magnitude increase. Since the agents have increased the number of friends they hold, each individual friend is less important. Therefore it takes a larger decrease in the number of friends caused by more expensive friends to generate the small-world e ect.
IV. Policy Discussion
One of the leading topics in the discussion of referral based hiring has been the e ect on disadvantaged social groups 18 , 5 , 3 , 1 , 19 . The research m a k es two m a i n points about inequality in regard to referral based hiring: One policy approach that a ects the potential inequality created by referral based hiring is a rmative action. With regard to our model, a rmative action could help create equality i n t wo w ays. First, it may be thought o f a s a w ay to limit over-competition for friendship networks and to cap the social dilemma problem. As observed at the end of the previous section, limiting the amount of networking increases the e ciency of the job market.
A s e c o n d w ay that a rmative action may be useful is by limiting unintentional discrimination on the part of employers. For instance, if the percent of white workers in a rm is high and social networks are strati ed by race, applicants to this rm who are referred are likely to be white as well. 6 If employers commonly hire by referral and get few minority applicants, the likelihood a minority is hired decreases even if the employer treats minorities equally with regard to the hiring decision. In this way e mployers may u n i n tentionally discriminate against minorities 6 For example Mouw see 19 p. 89 nds that rms who employ few black w orkers .05-10 of the workforce being black are 75 less likely to hire a black w orker if they hire through referral instead of using a newspaper advertisement. without any ill-will. A rmative action can remedy the problem by encouraging socially segregated rms to hire workers by means other than referral and thereby increase the diversity of applicants.
Another issue raised in our model is in the relative costs of the various means to search for jobs. The advent o f the Internet has certainly changed the ways that individuals maintain friendships. Electronic mail, for instance, has made it cheaper to keep in contact with friends, especially periphery friends that one does not see often. What implication does this have for our results above?
As friendships get cheaper to maintain, agents spend a larger portion of their time networking. Depending on the degree of integration in a society, our model predicts that poorly networked people may fair better or worse. If a population remains highly segregated as the use of networking increases, poorly-connected people are shut out from an increasingly important method to access jobs. But, in our model we also observe that as networking increases the structure of the social networks becomes less local. The social networks are wider and the amount of clustering relative to a random graph decreases. Therefore it may b e easier for a poorly connected person to break into the job loop."
For real labor markets the question becomes which e ffect will dominate?" Will the less local structure of social networks allow poorly connected individuals to expand into well connected social networks? Or will inexpensive friendship maintenance cause extreme over-competition with respect to individuals in well connected networks and thereby increase inequality? If networks become so cheap that everyone knows everyone else the network is su ciently dense, disadvantaged individuals will prosper along with advantaged individuals. But there is a problem: if the real reason for hiring by referral is decreasing uncertainty a b o u t the quality of a new hire, it is not likely that an outsider to the old-boys network" will be able to use a connection to a distant person not known well. And, an employer only gains con dence through referral if the referee knows the applicant w ell. With this in mind, individuals newly connected to the old-boys network" may not be able to pro t from a better network position until they become well established in the new network. Therefore an increase in the ease of maintaining friendships has unclear implications for creating equality.
As a nal policy consideration we m a y think of a third job search strategy that may be added to our model: education. While education is not directly a search strategy it is important or required for getting many jobs. If we i ncorporate education as a choice variable that helps agents get jobs it is likely that we will still get over-networking given a su ciently low cost of maintaining friends. If this is true the high dependence on friends for attaining jobs may reduce the value of education in a society | potentially an even worse social dilemma.
Another possibility with respect to education more directly concerns poorly connected people. If social networks become increasingly important in nding jobs even a well educated person may h a ve di culty nding employment i f he is not well connected. In turn this may a ect his education ch o i c e i n t wo w ays: rst, if he is not well connected his value of education may b e l o wer than another person with better connections. This is because he may not be able to capitalize on the education he holds. Second, if networks are important in nding jobs, a person has an incentive t o choose the occupation for which he has the best network. If all of his friends have l o w education jobs it may b e o ptimal to choose the same low education profession because it may maximize the likelihood of becoming employed. If so, individuals may encounter poverty-traps where low e ducation choices are reinforced by the other members of a population group.
V. Conclusion
We used an evolutionary model with endogenous tness to study the e ciency of information transfer in a labor market setting. In our model small-world referral networks emerge as an e cient means to transfer information in the labor market. We observe a signi cant amount o f l o c a l structure in the evolved networks but the local structure does not preclude the e cient transfer of information as measured by the average path length. As evolution progresses we observe a s e c o n d c haracteristic: the population loses e ciency over time as indicated by a decrease in population size. Investigation reveals that over competition for social networks cause the e ciency loss. The result is reminiscent of traditional social dilemmas such as the prisoner's dilemma, in that agents maximize individual local e ciency at the expense of population global e ciency.
The predictions of our model allow us to make some considerations on the inequality issues related to the prevalence of referral based hiring methods and the structure of social networks. Additional research directly related to these policy areas is possible within our model with minor modi cations. Of particular interest may be the e ect of referral based hiring on education choices. By adding education as a choice variable to our model we can view how the education a person chooses is a ected by her referral network. This approach w ould add to considerations of peer e ects in the attainment of education.
Another area we hope to consider is the e ect of referral based hiring on social segregation. Individuals may h a ve incentives to open or close a social network for the purposes of gaining jobs. As an example, if a person has many u nemployed friends he would like to meet a group of employed people. But, since his friends are unemployed he is of less value than a better connected person as a job contact. People in poorly connected groups would like to join a better connected group but the people in this group would like t o remain exclusive to lessen competition for jobs. Studying this dynamic would add to our understanding of the e ect that labor markets and nancial prosperity h a ve on e orts to better integrate society.
